# Introduction

## Puzzle

* Dormant claims
* Many states have undemarcated borders but still do not have competing claims

## Research Questions

* First, what are the structural conditions that lead some states to make claims when others don't
* Second, why do states choose to make claims when they do? In many cases, states

## Advantages of cure models

* Structural vs. proximate
* Account for inflated-0s

## Theory Outline

* Claims carry opportunity costs
* Leaders only initiate claims when EU > Opp Costs
* Transitions from Latent Disputes to Active When Domestic Political Shocks
* Political elites use territorial claims to gather support
  + Leadership changes lead to new leader/coalition that wants to alter the status quo

# Literature Review Text

## Historical Claims

### Importance to Domestic Audiences

At the domestic level, justifications rooted in historical ownership are more likely to be viewed favorably for three reasons. First, individuals are more likely to have personal ties to the territory in question. Second, it is easier for leaders to persuade audiences that territorial claims are closely related to national identity. Third,

Second, the issue-based explanation fails to account for numerous cases where the contested territory held little value for either of the claimants. For example, the border territory disputed by Eritrea and Ethiopia has little tangible value for either state.

## Power

% Even peaceful backed by threat – Huth, Vasquez, bargaining theory, Hensel, negative peace, mattes, rivalry – look at your notes for the territory paper, somebody says this

## Contiguity/Distance/Major Powers

Fighting at a distance requires that states move their troops and supplies across one or more third parties’ territory or airspace. This requires that the challenger states either obtain permission from these intermediary states or otherwise occupy their territory.

Moreover, the farther military forces must travel to reach their target, the more costly fighting becomes as transportation costs increase. Only major powers are likely to be able to project force at a distance

## Norms

As more states gained independence from their former colonizers, the potential for claims to emerge between these states to compete over territory increased. In particular, postcolonial states often found themselves competing with their neighbors due to the arbitrary nature of the borders that were established by Western powers. In addition, the development of norms regarding territorial integrity that dictate that preexisting state boundaries should not be adjusted (even when such claims involve self-determination) has, in theory, deterred some states from making claims that are unlikely to be regarded as legitimate. States are also less likely to issue claims when they have common security interests such as mutual alliances.

## **Border Territory**

First, noncontiguous states are unlikely to find themselves in competition over the same territory, with the exception of major powers. By definition, noncontiguous states will not find themselves competing over shared borders which is particularly likely to be highly salient due to its implications for the security of the state and national identity \citep{owsiak2012}. Noncontiguous states are also unlikely to find themselves competing over territory due to secessionist or irredentist motives and are less likely to find themselves in conflict over territory that one or both states have historical sovereignty over. Since other territory tends to be less valuable to contestants, the probability that two states find themselves in competition over a piece of territory that both value highly is diminished.

# Literature Review Notes

## Abramson and Carter 2015

I think this works as follows – create grid cells along territory that is contested by ICOW at some point – analyze these – do not include pairs of countries that do not ever have claims. Not dyadic UOA – two dyads could have many different contested grid cells.

DV = number of claims to grid cell

DV2 = time until claim onset over grid cell

All grid cells are eventually subject to claim onset

Not time-varying data

## Burghardt 1973

Ilaw modes of territorial acquisition

* Occupation of previously unadmiistured territory
* Prescription – effective control for a long period of time
* Cession from one state to another by treaty
* Accretion – growth of territory through acts of nature
* Conquest is outside law

Nonlegal/political claims according to Hill

* Strategic
* Geographical
* Historical
* Economic
* Ethnic
* Miscellaneous

Nonlegal/political claims according to Pounds

* Strategic
* Economic
* Proximity
* Spheres of influence
* Geographical
* Ethnic

Nonlegal/political claims according to Strausz-Hupe and Possony

* Linguistic
* Religious
* Cultural
* Military
* Economic
* Historical
* Administrative
* Ideological
* Geographical
* Racial
* Sociological
* Psychological

Seven categories of Burghardt – most claims are composites of these: effective control, historical, cultural, territorial integrity, economic, ethnic, ideological

* Effective control
  + Continuous administration/occupation of land
  + Morocco/Algeria dispute whether Sahara is uncontested
  + Conquest alls under this
  + Newly independent state inherits territory from preexisting colonial system – uti possidetis, ita possideatis – as you possess, so may you possess – Latin American states – effective control devoloved from colonial to local power – Africa as well
* Historical
  + Forms emotional basis – key to self-identity
  + Based on priority or duration
  + Priority – being there first – discovery, exploration, occupation, settlement by ethnic groups
    - claims based on coercive relinquishment of territory
    - often applied within temporal and cultural limits – e.g., European powers ignored indigenous claims
    - do not usually go back to beginning of history – extended to furthest point in tie pertinent to the existing problem
  + Duration – existence of long period of time (preferably to the present day) of those features that form the basis of the claim
    - E.g., easentry has lived there for centuries – closely tied to land –should not be violated politically
    - Often these are claims by minority groups
    - States often try to solve this using forced uprooting and dispersal of minority groups – sometimes mutual expulsion by two states
    - States try to plant loyal people in area concerned
  + Most powerful claim based on history is homeland
    - Homealdn includes priority and duration – man-land symbiosis – indispensable part of national identit
    - Reclaiming homeland is disannexation, revindication, or restoration – normal course of history was rent by conquest – restoration to original order is restitution in justice
* Cultural
  + Sence of a group of people belonging together
  + Nationality – feeling of loyalty to a particular country, both land and people
  + Nationalisms and attenant irredentisms
  + Ethnic religious and other cultural characteristics that bind peole together
  + Language in Europe
  + Religion in Middle East and Africa
  + Irredentism depends on the existence of compact areas
  + Ultimate cultural-political ideal is self-determination – right of group to have its own state or share with kinsmen fashioning of a state – usually assume there is a big enough area of homogenous inhabitatns to form an effective political unit
  + Majority rule – largest cultural group is entitled to control administration of territory – counters irredentism – rather than changing boundaries to allow members of one nationality to existence within one state, boundaries are set and minorities conform to wishes of majority
  + Majority rules is highly venerated today
  + Majority rule is unlikely to work in areas with strong self-concious minorities
* Territorial integrity
  + Claims based on relative location of an area
  + Land claimed because contiguous territory already emerged or because physical connectivity is perceived to exist (e.g., physical boundaries)
  + Regions of attraction or hinterland
  + Certain areas possess unity, integrity, or wholeness – geographical claims
  + Claim to entire continent -- Examples: Manifest Destiny, pan-Africanism – remove white political supremacy from continent, pan-Arabism
  + River basins, peninsulas, and islands
  + Land joins and water separates
  + Extension to contiguity back to sea extended from landmasses and islands to oceans
* Economic
  + Control of territory is necessary to viability or development of state
  + Tend to deal with small bits of territory
  + Port cities, railroad lines, ship channels, mineral deposits
  + Territory demanded as compensation for war
  + Question of whether to grant independence is often based on economic grounds – e.g., Catelonia in spain
* Elitist
  + Particular minority has the right or duty to control certain territories
  + Most widely used claims throught history
  + Divine right, families inherit certain land
  + White race had mandate to control world
  + Technological ability – group has ability to develop territory
* Ideological
  + Spread faith through territory
  + Anticolonialism
  + Justice – recompense for injustices and sufferings – Israel and Arabs both

Potential example – Balkan claims when emerging from Turkish rule

Problems emerge when claims clash

* Can any territory belong permanently group, even if it no longer occupies the land effectively
* Can territory onder control by onse state be claimed by another due to significance of claimant > significance of possessor
* If group conrols territory allows in another group who then become majority, do hosts have better claim due to priority or immigrants due to majority rule
* IF elite group develops economy but there is another group has cultural majority, who has better claim
* Who has greater claim in secessionism – overall majority or local majority

Territoriality – Lorenze, Rdery

* Attachement of animals to area
* Inate human attachment
* Three ingredients of human territoriality
  + – spatial identity
  + Sense of exclusiveness – citizen alien dichotomy
  + Compartmentalization or channeling of human interaction in space
* Fits territorial integrity claims

## Carter and Goemans 2011

## Caselli 2015

Caselli, Francesco, Massimo Morelli, and Dominic Rohner. 2015. The Geography of Interstate Resource

Wars. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 130 (1):267–315. – goemans2016 say this is related to claim onset

## Englebert, Tarango, and Carter 2002.

‘‘Dismemberment and Suffocation: A Contribution to the Debate on African Boundaries.’’ Comparative Political Studies 35 (10): 1093-118

Circumstances that increases probability of irredentist claims – level of precolfonial statehood of the partitioned group, prevalence of ethnic nationalism in claimant, degree of enforcement of the border – Touval 1969, Kapil 1966 – p 1097

## Goeman and Schultz 2016

## Huth 1996/2009

Huth examines timing of onset in his data when claims break out between states that eventually enter claim onset – he includes 129 cases and 129 nondispute dyads – selected via random sampling of all contiguous land borders – randomly specifies which is a challenger

1. Issues
   1. Strategic location
   2. Economic value
   3. Ethnic ties
2. International context
   1. Balance of capabilities
   2. Prior gain of territory by challenger (???)
   3. Common security ties
   4. Prior border agreement signed by challenger
3. Domestic context
   1. Prior unresolved dispute for challenger – loss of any territory
   2. Prior loss of territory by challenger
   3. Domestic Support for decolonization of colonial territories

Findings

* Issues
  + Strategic claims increase probability of contestation
  + Bordering minority groups w/in target shares language and ethnicity – decreases slightly
  + Challenger/Target share ties of a common language and ethnicity
  + Natural resources increase probability
* International
  + Challenger to target capabilities increases probability
  + Prior gain by challenger decreases
  + Number of target’s Alliance partners decrease
  + Border agreement decreases
* Domestic
  + Prior unsettled dispute increases
  + Previous loss of territory by challenger increase
  + Challengers are more likely to - when leaders could portray their territorial claims as supporting decolonization and self-determination, a dispute with the target was more likely. As predicted by H16, colonial and overseas borders were quite likely to be disputed by leadersofdevelopingcountrieswhocouldconsistentlyrallystrongdomestic political support for such territorial claims given the widespread support for the norm of decolonization in the postwar period.

Problems

* Selects on militarized claims
* Limited to post-war era
* Ignores domestic and international institutions

## Mansbach and Vasquez 1983

Where do issues emerge from?

* Environmental – issues that are not directly associated w/ the behavior of the actors – emerge when the environment when an opportunity for increased value satisfaction or a fear of value deprivation emerges. These merge slowly and reveal themselves gradually. This causes the salience of old stakes to change and new stakes to be pursued
  + Opportunity issues – emerge when the capacity of humans to transform previously valueless objects into those with value arises or when humans ‘invent’ stakes with greater value than those that had previously existed – e.g., technological progress
  + Disaster issues – no actor intentionally creates issues – plague, pollution, overpop, climate change, resource depletion – involve regulation of physical environment or of the actors behavior wrt the environment
    - Disaster issues encourage collective problem solving as long as everyone has a relatively equal stake in it
* Behavioral – actors purposeful behavior creates a new stake, revives an old one, or alters the values ascribed to an existing stake
  + Commonly raised by actors that wish to redistribute stakes that other actors control, i.e., revisionist states
  + Imperialism and revisionism/revolution fall under this category
  + Deprivation Issues

## Murphy 1990

## Schultz 2015

Uses Huth Allee dataset of 1947-2000

A second possible use of these data is to examine the determinants of territorial conflicts. Prior work has examined the origins of territorial disputes at the dyadic level (e.g., Huth 1996; Englebert, Tarango, and Carter 2002): that is, is there a dispute between state A and state B? But, as we have seen, there is considerable variation in the extent of territorial claims that states make against one another. States rarely claim all or even most of their neighbors’ territory; indeed, the relatively small size of most claims suggests that states consider some pieces of territory worth claiming and others not. What explains this variation? To the extent that the relevant determinants vary along the length of a given dyadic border, analyses performed at the dyadic level are not well suited to answering this question (Goemans and Schultz 2015).

It may be, for example, that international norms and political considerations prevent states from confining their claims to oil-rich regions. States rarely claim territory on the basis of ‘‘wants’’; instead, they must be able to justify a right to the territory (Zartman 1969, 85). This constraint might cause states to make oil-based claims inefficiently—that is, in a way that includes territory that does not contain oil and excludes some territory that does (see, e.g., Murphy 1990, 538-39).

## Touval 1972

## Vasquez on leader characteristics

The work of Frederick Hoffmann (1970) provides some insight on this question. In an analysis of legislative arms debates, he finds that conservative and radical arguments are always presented and seem unaffected by external factors. This leads him to conclude that a person’s security views are not derived from “objective” factors, but are a function of individual beliefs and predispositions.

Margaret Hermann’s (1980) argument that there are four types of personal characteristics that can affect foreign policy decisions – beliefs, motives, decision style, and interpersonal style – can be of help. For now all that is necessary is to focus on beliefs and leave open the question of why those beliefs are held. Beliefs are easier to identify and a focus on them does not impugn anyone’s motives or style.

More significantly, Wittkopf and Maggiotto (1983) (see also Wittkopf, 1987) employ the concept to identify two (of four) groupings of elite and mass opinion on foreign policy (hard-liners, accommodationists, isolationists, and internationalists).

What are the traits that make hard-liners prone to the most dangerous and least prudent aspects of the realist folklore? One likely candidate is risk-taking. Clearly, hard-liners will be much more willing to take risks, but this in part may be a function of the fact that what is at issue is of greater salience to them than to accommodationists or others. Michael Haas (1974: 110–25), in his study of thirty-two major decisions, found the propensity to take risks related to the use of violence. Crow and Noel (1977: 400; cited in Guetzkow and Valadez, 1981a: 206) found that players in a simulation who were risk-takers tended to use higher levels of military force in responding to a crisis than those who were more risk-averse, but that these tendencies were moderated when players worked within a group. Although we can assume that within a crisis hard-liners would be more willing to take risks, research shows that the tendency to take risks will be affected by the context in which the decision takes place (Guetzkow and Valadez, 1981b: 275–76) and whether a decision maker is facing the prospect of losses or gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).

Another major factor affecting the use of force is the cognitive complexity of an individual, i.e. the extent to which a person’s thinking and concepts tend to be abstract and elaborate, as opposed to concrete (Guetzkow and Valadez, 1981a: 203–4). Driver (1977: 342; cited in Guetzkow and Valadez, 1981b: 261) found that players with simple (as opposed to complex) cognitive structures tend to involve their simulated nations in more aggressive behavior. Margaret Hermann (1974: 220–23; see also M. Hermann, 1980) uncovered a similar finding in her content analysis of national leaders’ speeches; she found those with low cognitive complexity engaging in more conflict. Suedfeld and Tetlock (1977) in a content analysis of documents find that complexity of information processing and communication is lower in crises that ended in war (1914 and Korea) than in those that were peacefully settled (1911 Moroccan crisis, Berlin Blockade, and Cuban Missile crisis). Similarly, they also find complexity declining in UN speeches dealing with the Middle East situation just prior to the outbreak of war (Suedfeld, Tetlock, and Ramirez, 1977).

A refined measure of integrative complexity of archival sources, which examines the ability of leaders to differentiate a number of dimensions in information and integrate these into combinations, was found to decline during American–Soviet crises (Wallace and Suedfeld, 1988). These findings, however, may be measuring the effects of decision makers’ stress; when Levi and Tetlock (1980) examine the cognitive complexity of Japanese decision makers’ planning to attack Pearl Harbor, they found that complexity was high not low, indicating that when war is premeditated and initiated, cognitive complexity is not low.3 It makes sense that hard-liners would look at the use of force as a simple way of resolving problems, and the fact that Leng (1983) found that leaders did not follow realist advice about prudence seems to support this conclusion. Nevertheless, the fact remains that force is usually a last resort. It may be that by this time the situation appears cognitively simple because no other options are perceived as possible. In this regard, it is interesting that Margaret Hermann (1974: 220–23) finds conflict associated with leaders not having a great belief in their ability to control events, a finding similar to Holsti’s (1972: 151) evidence showing that in the 1914 crisis leaders perceived their adversaries as having more options than they had themselves. As Wallace and Suedfeld (1988: 442, 449–50) argue, integrative complexity may be a behavioral variable that is affected by external events, and, therefore, as crises intensify and war looms it will go down. Other studies of the Inter-Nation Simulation have found that players who are nationalistic and who hold a militaristic world view are more apt to escalate conflict than are others (Crow and Noel, 1965: 8, 20; Guetzkow and Valadez, 1981a: 206–7). M. Hermann (1974) also found nationalistic leaders to be more conflictive. Similarly, Etheredge (1978), in a study of US State Department personnel, found that those who have an idealized view of American diplomatic history are more prone to advocate force than those who have a more revisionist view of American diplomatic history. That hard-liners would be more nationalistic makes sense. We would expect hard-liners to emphasize the importance of force and to be nationalistic, particularly as a rivalry progressed and war seemed more likely. This also emphasizes the point that hard-line predispositions are not invariant, but grow as the prospect of war grows, so that in the end more and more of the elite and domestic populace become hard-liners. Thus, it is significant that studies have found distrust and hostility to be associated with the advocacy of violence (Etheredge, 1978: 127; M. Haas, 1974: 110–25; Driver, 1977; Brody, 1963; see also Holsti et al. 1968). Furthermore, Driver (1977: 350 cited in Guetzkow and Valadez, 1981a: 204, 210) found that a simple cognitive structure is associated with violence when the individual is distrustful. One of the few studies dealing with foreign policy that find a clear personality trait associated with violence is Etheredge’s (1978) content analysis of US presidents and their advisors. He finds that when there is disagreement among high-level foreign policy makers, interpersonal style becomes an important factor (see also M. Hermann 1978 for other situations when personal characteristics are seen as being able to have an impact). Etheredge (1978: 79, 85) finds that those whom he scored high on personal dominance are more apt to advocate the use of force and oppose conciliatory moves. This was true in thirty-eight of the forty-nine cases he (77.5 percent) studied. Graham Shepard (1988) replicated Etheredge’s study for the 1969–84 period and found that in the presence of disagreement, decision makers with a high dominance interpersonal style tend to advocate the use of force, while those with a low dominance style do not. Shepard (1988: 120) found this to be the case in 76.9 percent of the 108 cases he studied. Although these studies must be regarded as highly tentative, they do offer a more detailed portrait of the beliefs and attitudes that make the hard-liner more predisposed to engage in power politics and escalatory actions. The hard-liners’ cognitive map of the world tends to be simple rather than complex. Hard-liners tend to be nationalistic and hold a militaristic view of the world. The hard-liner as a type is hostile toward and distrustful of the other nation, and feels unable to control events. In a crisis they are risk-takers. In personal relations they are prone to dominance. Except for the last, which is a personality characteristic, it is clear that the characteristics hard-liners share are something they have learned from their experience or imbibed from the culture around them. The remainder of this chapter will attempt to delineate how the steps to war create a domestic political environment in which hard-liners flourish and more and more people learn to become hard-liners, whether they like it or not. Determining the Initial Balance Between Hard-Liners and Accommodationists

# Theory

Huth 1996 p99 has examples of nondispute cases

* Proximate vs. structural
  + Diehl stinnett 2001 structural vs behavioral, mansbach1983
  + Structural
    - Things that do not change rapidly over time
      * Constraints – opportunity
      * Aligned interests – willingness
    - Value of the territory (willingness)
      * either do not change or rarely change – changes in technology – discovery of new resources
      * dyadic characteristics - structure the costs of issuing a claim
  + Proximate
    - Changes in expected utility
      * Changes in opportunity
        + changes in capabilities
      * Changes in preferences
    - creation of commitment problems
* International Shocks
  + Uncertainty: Capability change, major power status – bargaining underlies this – the ability to pose a credible threat is key to bargaining leverage – opportunity
* Domestic Shocks
  + Challengers use international disputes to mobilize support
    - Territory is salient – nationalist sentiments, economic benefits,
  + Turnover leads to actualization of that position – lock-in – audience costs to backing down – leader might want to back down due to costs – especially important at the beginning of a regime change due to shifts in power

Theory on preference changes: Friedan 1999

## Causes of Claims

The emergence of territorial claims is also closely tied to

* Competition over each other’s homeland territory
  + Expansionism
  + Irredentism
  + State birth / secessionism
  + Postcolonial “secession”
  + Historical ownership
  + New boundaries
* Competition by colonizers over colonial territory
  + Spheres of influence/colonial territory
* Competition between colonizers and states with land they wish to claim
* Competition between two new states

Self-determination

Secessionism

Institutions/poorly demarcated borders

Easily linked to national identity

## Justifications

most leaders try to make clearly bounded claims with plausible justification to signal that they  
are not an expansionist or unlimited aims type (Goemans and Schultz, 2014).

Justifications are constraints

\citet{abramson2015} argue that claims based on historical ownership are easier for leaders to justify to relevant stakeholders, including domestic audiences, opponents, and international actors (e.g., other states or the International Court of Justice). At the domestic level

The strength of a state’s justification also influence the extent to which impose costs on revisionist states.

* Also influences whether states are perceived as expansionist powers
* Provide cover
* Domestic claims
  + Easily linked to national identity
* Codified in international law
* especially when these claims are codified in treaties between the relevant actors \citep{burghardt1973, murphy1990}.

## Structural Factors

### Contiguity

Additional warrants for contiguity and opportunity

* This is especially true if states have to cross oceans to reach their target, requiring a large naval capability.
* Contiguity doesn’t generally change unless another party conquers territory or a secessionist state removes the mutual border – or loss of colonies
* **One of the major determinants of opportunity is whether a potential challenger is a contiguous neighbor of the target, for two reasons.**
* Interactions –vasquez1993, starrandmost1978 – greater uncertainty – security dilemma – diehl1985, 1991

### Asymmetric Territory

* Bell2016 has example of asymmetry in territorial disputes

## Proximate Causes

### Capability Change

Given this newfound bargaining leverage, these states may seek revision of the status quo.

Power Change

* Expansionism/predation
* Relative decline
* Commitment problems
* Irredentism

% But growing asymmetry may also lead to changes (e.g., commitment problem).

## Subjective valuation

* In most cases, changes in the value of territory are product of states actions and do not occur very often (e.g., changes in two states’ resources may make strategic territory more valuable).
* Resources: For example, \citep{schultz2015} finds that the presence of oil along a particular piece of a border does not influence the probability that that territory is contested. Similarly, \citep{abramson2015} find that claims over militarily and economically valuable territory are most likely when there are multiple historical claims to a given piece of territory and more recent claims increase the probability of contestation. Resources negative – see also goemans2016
* Strategically valuable: Territory that possesses strategic value such as rivers or mountainous terrain has generally been found to increase the probability of claim onset \citep{abramson2015, huth2009}.
* % Caveats to strategy: Goemans2016 find that border area and border length are insignificant – only in africa. \footnote{In contrast, \citep{goemans2016} argue that easily identifiable physical features such as rivers act as focal points for drawing borders and therefore decrease claim onset.}
* Ethnic: In addition, territory is often tied to group identity (ethnic, linguistic, national, religious).

## Issue Emergence Theory

* Changes in the environment
  + Opportunity
  + Disaster
* Behavioral changes
  + Opportunity
    - Changes in capabilities
    - Changes in external security environment

Large changes in a state’s foreign policy are likely to occur?

## Rationality, Opportunity, and Willingness

As with any analysis that relies on rational choice theory, determining when leader’s initiate territorial claims requires identify the factors that influence their state’s opportunity and willingness.

For states to issue claims they must be valuable and they must have the opportunity to win

* Threat of force
* Legal case

Implicit underlying bargaining process

## Proximate Onset of Territorial Claims

Do not immediately issue claims over territory that they have the opportunity and motivation to obtain.

Claims emerge from …. State birth, colonialism, expansionism, irredentism, etc.

However, not all states choose to press such a claim immediately.

## Proximate Onset

As with structural claims, the presence of proximate causes are not sufficient by themselves to lead to the emergence of territorial disputes. Many dyads (including those with a history of contentious relationships) experience events that have the potential to produce

Structural causes include the fundamental issues that motivate states to initiate a claim as well as the environmental constraints that determine whether or not they are able to

## Interaction Effect

## Hypotheses

\begin{hypothesis}: An increase in the ratio of the weaker state’s capabilities to the stronger state’s capabilities increases the probability of claim onset \end{hypothesis}

% \begin{hypothesis} Changes in a state’s winning coalition increase the probability of the onset of territorial claims. \label{hyp\_solschange} \end{hypothesis}

% \begin{hypothesis} Changes in a state’s leader are more likely to increase the probability of the onset of territorial claims when they coincide with changes in coalitions. \label{hyp\_interaction} \end{hypothesis}

% \begin{hypothesis} Changes in a state’s leader increase the probability of the onset of territorial claims. \label{hyp\_leaderchange} \end{hypothesis}

# Future work

Examine disaggregation of irregular v regular leadership changes

## Armenia-Azerbaijan

Armenia-Azerbaijan example - parts of the border are not demarcated but are not contested - unlike Nagorno-Karabakh - this example only speaks to the features of the border territory itself, not dyadic reasons for making a claim - <https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/just-another-incident-or-an-evolving-status-quo/>

## Bhutan-China

china bhutan - 710760 - china claims border at several points - huth claim begins in 1979 - ICOW has it begining in 1971

## Canada-Denmark

Canada v. Denmark - 020390

Claim begins in 1971

Claim over Hans Island

Barren island in strait that is part Canada part greenland

Claim wasn't made until delimiting maritime boundary

## Chad-Libya

483620

483 born 1960

620 born 1951

Dispute over name Aozou Strip – occurs when Libya uses Chad’s territory (the strip) as a staging ground for troops-

## China-India

Similar example with India/China - <https://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/the-doklam-standoff-some-basic-facts>

## China-Japan

710740

ChinaJapan Senkaku dispute begins in 1951 - China contests 1895 peace treaty - begins before surveyswere conducted in 1968

China solschange in 1949

Japan occupied islands during war with China - China agreed to annexation - China could have exercised a previous control/nationalism claim at any point before this

According to ICOW, Senkaku doesn't start until 1972

Other China disputes may prove useful

### Shandong/Shantung - East China - dispute begins in 1918

first sino-japanese war - 1884-1885 (fought over control of Korea) - second, 1937-1945 - dispute emerges from Treaty of Versailles after first world war which precipitates the claim

Settled first time in 1895 - Japan occupies in first Sino-Japanese war - Treaty gives control to Japan

End of ruso-japanese war leads to agreement that Russia and Japan would return manchuria to china, expect Liaodong peninsula - this occurs in 1905

China starts dispute with Japan in 1931 and 1932

## Colombia-Nicaragua

Nicaragua - Colombia --- 93100 Nicaragua declares old treaty null in 1980

Dispute over Caribbean archipelago of San Andreas and Providencia

Sandanista government assumed power and renounced treaty, saying it was signed under US pressure and military occupation

Quina\_sueno\_roncdador-Serrana claim and San Andres y Providencia.

ICOW years - repeated claim

Quita Sueno-Roncador-Serrana 190001 192803

San Andres y Providencia 190001 193005

Quita Sueno-Roncador-Serrana 197912 200199

San Andres y Providencia 197912 200199

## Cuba-US

Example - Cuba (challenger) contests US military base at Guantanamo once Castro comes to power

## Ecuador-Peru

Ecuador/Peru - 1990/1998

Rivals from 1994-1998 (KGD) or 1990-2000 (Thompson)

Territorial disputes begin in May 1990 or May 1998

colombia 100

ecquador 130

peru 135

100135 - rivals from 1899-1934

100130 - rivals from 1857-1863

130135 - rivals from 1891-1955, 1977-1998 - terrclaim begins in 1854 and 1947

On September 29, 1960 Ecuadorian president José María Velasco Ibarra declared the Rio Protocol null and void. (Peruvian analysts have speculated that this was a politically motivated move by Velasco Ibarra, who was considered a populist, but evidence to support this assertion is totally circumstantial).

Claimed coercion

In 1946/47 it became an issue again due to disagreements on border

Stopped cooperating

Based on ICOW – claim ends in 1945 but new claim emerges in 1947 b/c of US surveys that reveal river longer than believed

## Egypt-Israel

651666 - rivals from 1948 (birth of Israel) - claim of interest is 1967 - some are active before then

## Greece-Turkey

Greece Turkey have an Aegean Sea Islands claim that starts in 1964

## Indonesia-Portugal

Civil war - indonesia/portugal - outbreak of civil war in east timor in 1975 - prior was portuguese control, after is indonesia control - becomes independent in 2002

## Iran-Russia

Iran/Russia - Russia begins in 1816 - Iran begins in 1855 - ICOW has disputes beginning in 1869, 1876, 1892, 1902, 1919, 1939

The Russian Empire began to move into the area in 1869 with the establishment of the Caspian Sea port of Krasnovodsk, current-day Turkmenbashy.[4] After the suppression of Khanates of Bukhara (1868) and Khiva (1873) the Turkmen area remained independent.'

Krasnovodsk 186911 186912

Turkomen Tribal Areas 187609 187705

Firuze 189202 189306

Sarakhs 190201 192102

Firuze-Achuradeh-Astrabad 191901 192102

Firuze 193901 195412

Firuze dispute starts and stops several times

In 1828 USSR/Iran boundary is defined - this is partially modified in 1893 (which is the end of the first dispute)

Soviet violations in 1948-1950 violate demarcated boundary

Part of dispute is Shindan/Shandan - strong position

https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79-00976A000200010003-4.pdf

Violations appear to begin in ~ 1939

Boundary is delimiated in 1954

"In view of the facts that the Soviets have not ceded any of this territory to Iran and that the Iranian maps are based on Soviet sources, it is not surprising that possible claims in the Kopet Dag area have not been pressed." CIA source above p. 42

This includes Firuze and areas to the east

historical animosity over russian behavior, irredentists in Iran trying to rejoin russia

Moscow uses WWII asgreements as an opportunity to create buffer zone in Norther Iran - who was this directed against?

Exterme eastern end of thhe USSR\_Iran boundary -

## Nigeria-Cameroon

Nigeria 475

Cameroon 471

After the independence of both Nigeria and Cameroon in 1960,[1][2] the status of British Cameroons was unclear. A United Nations-sponsored and supervised plebiscite took place the following February resulting in the northern part of the territory voting to remain part of Nigeria, while the southern part voted for reunification with Cameroon.[1] The northern part of British Cameroons was transferred to Nigeria the following June, while the southern part joined Cameroon in October.[3] However, the land and maritime boundaries between Nigeria and Cameroon were not clearly demarcated. One of the resultant disputes was in the Bakassi Peninsula, an area with large oil and gas reserves,[4] which had been de facto administered by Nigeria.[5] In the early 1960s, Nigeria recognised that the peninsula was not a historical part of Nigeria.[2] Nigeria claimed that the British had made an agreement with the local chiefs for protection, and that the resultant border of 1884 should be the official border. Cameroon claimed that the British–German border agreements in 1913 should demarcate the border between the two countries.[6][7] The dispute was not a major issue between the two countries until the Nigerian President, Yakubu Gowon, was overthrown by General Murtala Mohammed in July 1975. Mohammed claimed that Gowon had agreed to transfer Bakassi to Cameroon when he signed the Maroua Declaration in June. Mohammed's government never ratified the agreement, while Cameroon regarded it as being in force.[8]

Yakubu Gowon was civil war and postwar leader

Mohammed alegged that Gowon had gien Bakassi to Cameroon to legitimate coup

https://s3.amazonaws.com/ssrc-cdn1/crmuploads/new\_publication\_3/african-boundary-conflicts-and-international-mediation-the-absence-of-inclusivity-in-mediating-the-bakassi-peninsula-conflict.pdf

http://www.ipsnews.net/1996/05/nigeria-cameroon-guns-boom-over-disputed-territory/

The border dispute was inherited by the two countries from their former colonial rulers, Britain and Germany. A 1913 Anglo- German treaty had provided for a detailed survey of the area to enable proper demarcation of the boundaries between the two colonies. Before this could be done, the treaty was overtaken by the First World War, at the end of which the British acquired western Cameroon, while the east went to the French.

However, following negotiations between Nigeria and Cameroon from 1971 to 1975, the regime of then Nigerian ruler General Yakubu Gowon considered ceding the area to Cameroon as a reward for its support for Nigeria during the Biafran war of secession in 1967-1970.

However, when Gowon was overthrown, his successor, General Murtala Mohammed, refused to give up Bakassi, saying he would rather go to war than do so. While the matter remained unresolved, tempers were relatively cool until the end of 1994.

That was when Nigerian soldiers moved in to occupy the territory – inhabited mainly by Nigerians – less than three months after General Sani Abacha came to power.

Meanwhile, anti-British protests had erupted in the Calabar province over the 1913 treaty. The chiefs of the Efik people, who for centuries inhabited Bakassi Peninsula, were offended that the British had ignored the terms of protectorate treaty of 1884 they made with Queen Victoria. They pointed out that Britain could not give away Bakassi as the Old Calabar kingdom was not a conquered territory, but one that freely entered into a treaty of protection with imperial Britain.

The situation was overtaken by the outcome of the First World War, with Britain now administering northwest and southwest Cameroon along with Nigeria. On the eve of independence in 1960, the United Nations organised a plebiscite whereby northwest Cameroon voted to join Nigeria while southwest  
opted to join French Cameroon. Even then, Bakassi was not included in the deal.

Cameroon’s claim to the peninsula was strengthened by the decision in the 1970s of former Nigerian military ruler, General Yakubu Gowon, to cede the area in gratitude for Yaounde’s support of the federal forces during the  
1967-70 Biafran secessionist war. The process of formalising the cession culminated in the Maroua Declaration of 1975 signed by Gowon and then Cameroon President Ahmadu Ahidjo.

Gowon was overthrown two months after signing the Maroua Declaration. His successor, General Murtala Muhammed, repudiated the agreement on the grounds it had not been ratified by the ruling military organ. Obasanjo, who  
succeeded Muhammed after his death in a failed coup in 1976, held on to his predecessor’s position. Thus was the stage set for a protracted dispute.

<https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/feature/2002/10/15/focus-nigerias-response-icj-ruling-bakassi-peninsula>

See also

## Panama-Colombia

095100 - Panama v Colombia

Dyad begins in 1903 (year of Panama's birth), claim begins in 1920

Claim ends in 1938

Claim over Jurado

## Tanzania/Uganda – Kagera Salient

a Kakwa father and Lugbara mothe

justifications – ethnicity, river border, nationalist line

The Lugbara are an ethnic group who live mainly in the West Nile region of Uganda,in the adjoining area of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and in Morobo County Republic of South Sudan. They speak the Lugbara language, a Central Sudanic language similar to the language spoken by the Madi, with whom they also share many cultural similarities. They are also found in South Sudan where they are known as Mundu and other names.

According to Fred Guweddeko, a researcher at Makerere University, Amin was the son of Andreas Nyabire (1889–1976). Nyabire, a member of the Kakwa ethnic group, converted from Roman Catholicism to Islam in 1910 and changed his name to Amin Dada. He named his first-born son after himself. Abandoned by his father at a young age, Idi Amin grew up with his mother's family in a rural farming town in north-western Uganda. Guweddeko states that Amin's mother was Assa Aatte (1904–1970), an ethnic Lugbara and a traditional herbalist who treated members of Buganda royalty, among others.[12] Some sources have also described Amin as being of mixed Kakwa-Nubian origin.[15][b]

Buganda – bantu region – bantu are in kagera

Amin held a state funeral in April 1971 for Edward Mutesa, former King (Kabaka) of Buganda and President who had died in exile; freed many political prisoners; and reiterated his promise to hold free and fair elections to return the country to democratic rule in the shortest period possible.[36]

Luganda is primary language in Buganda

## Thailand/Laos

Thailand/Laos border dispute begins in 1984 (Huth and ICOW agree) - Thailand 1887, Laos 1953 - northern border west of Mekong and territory of Ban Rom Klao- 800812 - Border war begins in 1987

Dispute over map made by French surveyors in 1907 to mark borders b/t Siam and French Indochina - minor mID begins in 1984

Source: <http://www.icwa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/ERG-10.pdf>

Rom Klao village was created in 1982 when Thai Army settled Hmong tribe into spot - proximate cause is this - unsure why this occured then

## Yemen

North Yemen - terr claims from 1927-1934, 1980-May 1990

South Yemen - terr claim from 1967 to May 1990

Yemen/Saudi Arabia

670679 - border clashes in the 1990s - rivalry from 1994-1998

## Other Potential Cases

Japan/Russia probably have some good ones

Malaysiz challenges Spratly islands in 1979 - born in 1957

China Afghanistan - british poorly delimited border in 1800s - China claims it in 1949

Poland example in abramson2015

Vietnam example in abramson

## Potential New Cases

Morrocco 230

Western Sahara 230435 197410 197511 435 230

Western Sahara 230600 195709 197511 600 230

Magascar and France

Albania-Yugoslavia 1947

1993 – Cambodia challenges Vietnam for

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Mondol Kiri Province & Minor Border Areas |  |

After leader change

Leader change in 1963 leads Thailand to make claim against Cambodia for Ko Kut Island – public

## Sources for Cases

<https://www.worldcat.org/title/boundary-politics-of-independent-africa/oclc/601003724#borrow>

<https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/institutions-and-ethnic-politics-in-africa/696855CDE1BDD865EA1254D0A3843B82>

https://smile.amazon.com/Property-Political-Order-Africa-Comparative-ebook/dp/B00GY3MPQY?sa-no-redirect=1

# Examples – Discarded

## Oman-UAE

oman-uae - both begin in 1971 - dispute begins in 1977 - 696698 - claim ends in 1999 - discovery of oil

* Not tied to leadership or regime change in either state

## Example: Cambodia Thailand

Koh Kut Island Began in 1963 2with new leader in Thailand

* Public pressure

Following the election of Thanon Kittikachorn as Prime Minister by the military, Thailand issued a claim against Cambodia for Koh Kut Island – military conflict leads to change of hands in 1965

In 1963 Thanon Kittikachorn was appointed prime minister of Thailand by the military regime (following the natural death of former prime minister).

Nationalism, historical ownership, pop = 2, stratloc

Thailand would seize control of the island two years later.

\citep{chambers2010}

Thailand viewed this as a treaty entered into under duress

Discarded – leadership change happened after claim was made